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1. Introduction      
GRID computing includes applications, some of which are intelligence sensitive (genetics, 
space, industrial intellectual property, etc) and need to remain confidential. Current security 
is mostly based based on public (asymmetric) key algorithms (Salomaa, 1996) – hash 
function algorithms easy to calculate in direct, but estimated as impossible in reverse. The 
base assumption to this assertion is the difficulty of factorising prime numbers. This 
received however a serious blow in 1994 (Shor, 1994), when it was shown that (a 
hypothetical future) quantum computer could rapidly factorise prime numbers via a 
polynomial algorithm. As such messages could be intercepted and stored today awaiting for 
the availability of quantum processors, when they could conceivably be deciphered. 
Evidently, data with short “life-span” (2-5 years) is perfectly safe today, however censi, 
geological data, etc have long-term implications and need to be adequately protected. 
The other main security contender currently in use is the symmetric-key AES encryption 
(Daemen and Rijmen, 1996-2001 and 2006), that comes in 3 versions of key length 128, 192 
and 256 bit (with 10, 12, and 14 rounds, respectively). For AES-128 there is no known attack 
faster than the 2128 complexity of exhaustive search. However, AES-192 and AES-256 were 
recently shown (Biryukov and Khovratovich, 2009) to be breakable by attacks of 2176 and 2119 
complexities. While these are much faster than the exhaustive search, they are non-practical, 
and do not to pose a real threat (at the rate the world produces today data, ca. 0.2⋅1021 
bytes/year (261 × 256-bit ciphertexts) it would take 258 ≅ 1017 years data’s worth to recover 
just one AES key). The US National Security Agency (Hathaway, 2003) stated that “The 
design and strength of all key lengths of the AES algorithm (i.e., 128, 192 and 256) are 
sufficient to protect classified information up to the secret level.” From this assessment and 
the simple estimates above, it is apparent that given adequate key distribution protection 
AES cannot be broken – at least not in the next 1017 years (for 1 key). 
The secret key carrier on the other hand needs to be a stable long-term committed 
technology, that would not come under question any time soon (including from futuristic 
quantum processor attacks).  
1.1 Key distribution 
In cryptology it was shown (Vernam, 1926) that the use of a hash function with a key of 
equal length (or greater) than the message can guarantee the safety of the communication. 
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The problem of such a (symmetrical) key protocol is however the exhaustion of the hash 
tables – the functions are implemented as tables using random numbers delivered by 
natural sources (for instance alpha decays). After exhausting the tables, the communication 
partners need to re-establish contact and exchange a new set of tables. This has come to be 
known as the Key Distribution Problem. 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is secured by the very essence of the quantum nature: 
attempts to measure in any way quantum states collapses the state into one of its 
projections. The quantum state cannot be regenerated to its initial state, therefore it is 
impossible to be cloned and a copy thereof to be kept. The distribution of public quantum 
keys is thus similar to the Vernam cipher (symmetrical - with secret key). In particular, in 
Europe this has attracted attention as a means of immunisation against Echelon interception 
(Willan, 2004). 
2. Quantum encryption 
To transmit keys in quantum format the information can be coded in the various degrees of 
freedom of the quantum system used – in this case laser light. Laser light offers a number of 
qualifying degrees of freedom: transverse position/momentum, linear/circular polarisation 
as well as 2-photon entangled states. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Measurement of a circular R state in it’s eigen basis (giving always the correct result) 
and in that of its conjugate, linear, basis (giving 50% of the time one state and 50% the 
other). 
Whatever degrees of freedom are used, the central idea is to utilise sets of 2 conjugated 
degress of freedom. This is because if the receiver does not know in which base the bit was 
emitted and measures it in the wrong base, the laws of quantum mechanics guarantee an 
ambiguous outcome, thus conceiling the information. Consider in this respect figure 1 that  
shows the measurement of circular states in linear polarisation of laser light:|R〉 = 1/√2 |Ň〉 
+ 1/√2 |ņ〉 and |L〉 = 1/√2 |Ň〉 – 1/√2 |ņ〉. Measurement of |R〉 in the '×' basis gives 
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everytime the correct answer R since it is its own basis, in which it was produced. 
Measurement however in the the '+' basis (according to the norms-squared of its 
decomposition) yields 50% of time the answer Ň and 50% of time ņ, as the figure shows. For 
other conjugate quantities, say transverse-coordinate and transverse-momentum, the 
decomposition gives an infinite series of the conjugate quantity’s states: √2π|x〉 = ∫exp(-
ikx)|k〉 dk. The norms-squared of the decomposition are now all (infinitesimal) equal. This 
aspect is conjugate-variable dependent. In all cases the fundamental idea of quantum 
encryption is that without the correct information on the base of the bit sent, its 
measurement in the base of its conjugate degree of freedom yields an ambiguous result, 
hence concealing the information sent. Therefore, such a commodity allows the design of a 
public-key communication protocol that can be implemented maintaining the 
confidentiality of the key. 
There is still one more mention: all said is valid for single quantum entities (here photons). If 
we transmit N photons, the foreseeable interceptor (Eve), can make a statistics for each bit 
sent. She will observe when she has the wrong basis of figure 1: having enough photons, she 
divides the bit and sends it through both bases. The one with non-ambiguous statistics is 
evidently the right one. Hence without faint-photon pulses quantum protocols are rendered 
decipherable. 
2.1 Faint-photon pulses 
In order to use quantum properties, ensembles of very few quantum objects are necessary, 
to avoid small numbers of entities to be intercepted and the signal to be detected. 
For 2-3 photon pulses interference with the pulse causes the collapse of the quantum states 
destroying the pulse. The hypothetical eavesdropper, Eve, intercepting pulses sent by Alice 
to Bob, either destroys them (revealing her presence), or lets them go through. Theoretically 
even 2-3 photon pulses may allow interception by keeping 1 photon and passing through 
the other 1-2. Technically that is very demanding – so-called “beam-splitting” attack (Dusek, 
1999), and also, as it will be explained below. 
A typical setup uses a mono-mode laser, the intensity of which is attenuated at exit to the 
level of 2-3 photons/pulse. Since the laser line width is almost zero compared to the 
magnitude of its frequency, the light can be approximated as coherent. Today solid state 
lasers (in green for instance) have coherence lengths on the order of 100-200 m, and fiber-
lasers in the range of km’s. Coherence length is the distance over which the light wave has 
no phase-slips and retains the same frequency: L = c/nΔf, with c the speed of light, n the 
index of refraction in the respective medium and Δf the frequency width of the laser line. 
Evidently, for Δf → 0, L → ∞ and the laser is 100% mono-chromatic. The distribution of 
photon number of coherent states is given by a Poisson distribution: 





μμ −= =  
where n is the number of photons and μ the average number of photons per pulse. For an 
attenuated pulse of μ = 0.1, 90.48% of pulses contain no photons, 9.05% one photon, 0.45% 
two photons, 0.02% three photons, etc.  
It can be seen that the price for security is that of over 90% of pulses being empty.  
Given the corpuscular nature of the signals we equate the probability for a detector of 
efficiency η to produce m photoelectrons in response to the p(n) pulse: 
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The detector does not flag how many photons impacted it, rather it has a probability of 
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For N laser pulses there will be PN = Ndetected pulses, hence ημ = - ln(1-Idetected/I). To practically 
measure this quantity pulses are produced with a convenient (sub-MHz) frequency, 
attenuated, and measured as intensity vs. the source as the last equation shows. Knowing 
the detector efficiency η, the average number of photons/pulse μ is calculated. The systems 
have automated DAQ and data processing that controls this level. In the same procedure the 
attenuation (calibrated at the transmission’s initiation protocol) over the optical fiber is 
calculated and monitored. Interception will be manifest as a rise in this figure, revealing 
Eve’s presence. 
2.2 Signal coding 
The essence of quantum coding relies on chosing the correct measurement basis, a number 
of conjugate bases being available: transverse position/momentum, orthogonal polarisation 
bases, etc.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Experimental setup of  quantum key distribution scheme with photon transverse 
position and momentum.  
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Transverse position/momentum coding – this approach (Lemelle, 2006) encrypts the bits as 
two discrete positions of a simple slit aperture. In optics a transverse position measurement 
of a photon is associated with the near field or image plane, while a transverse momentum 
measurement is associated with the far-field or Fourier plane. Position and momentum 
measurements of an input field can be performed using simple optical imaging and Fourier 
systems along with a detector. An illustration of this scheme consists of two stages: 
preparation (Alice) and measurement (Bob). At Alice’s a plane wave illuminates a small slit 
aperture placed in the input plane, which localises the photon in the transverse plane to 
within the spatial dimensions of the slit. Because the photon’s position is now well defined, 
it can be considered in a definite transverse position state. In the second part Alice uses a 
random bit to decide which base (position or momentum) she will use: 
• position basis (x): she will use her lens such as to image her slit plane onto Bob's input 
plane (f1-1 = d1-1 + d2-1), where f1 is the focal length of the coding lens and d1,2 the 
distances slit-to lens and lens to Bob’s input plane, 
• momentum basis (p): she will use her lens as a Fourier lens system (f1=d1=d2) to create 
the Fourier transform of the slit at Bob's input plane, conducing Bob to chose a 
momentum eigen state. 
In the measurement stage Bob also chooses one of the two measurement bases position or 
momentum randomply. Bob projects either: 
• the (direct) image, by f2-1=d3-1+d4-1, where similarly to Alice f2 is the decoding lens, and 
d1,2 the distances input plane to lens and lens to detection screen, or  
• the Fourier transform, by f2=d3=d4 of his input plane onto his detection plane. 
That is: Bob either transports, or Fourier transforms his input, in essence being the inverse of 
Alice’s preparation system. 
There are thus four possible (Alice, Bob) configurations: (xx), (xp), (px), and (pp), where “x” 
is the position basis and “p” the momentum basis. 
Bob will have the correct result if his base choice matches Alice's base choice - i.e. only (xx) 
and (pp) will yield a correct transmission: 
• for (xx) or (pp), Bob should detect a photon at the detector plane in a position 
corresponding to that of Alice’s slit aperture. In the (xx) configuration, Alice and Bob 
implement two imaging systems, that is the image of the slit will be transported to the 
detection plane. In the (pp) configuration, two consecutive Fourier transforms are 
applied, returning a coordinate inversion. Thus, aside from this, Bob's detector plane 
will have the image of the slit position. In summary, when Alice and Bob use the same 
lens configurations, (xx) or (pp), their combined lens system produces the image of 
Alice’s slit aperture. Consequently, Bob should detect the correct state that Alice has 
prepared; 
• for the (xp) or (px) configurations, there is no correlation between Bob’s detected 
position and Alice’s slit position. In these arrangements Bob detects either the image of 
a Fourier transform or the Fourier transform of an image. The overall detection pattern 
will be that of a Fourier transform, providing no information on the position of Alice's 
slit, for the difference between "0" and "1" bits (a transverse position difference) shows 
up as a phase factor when Fourier transformed. Since detectors provide only amplitude 
information (phase being lost), precisely the crucial information is obscured, rendering 
the measurement lost. 
The setup described above was implemented by (Lemelle, 2006), illustrating the technique. 
Although the experiment was performed using an intense laser source (vulnerable to 
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eavesdropping), it allowed the clear illustration of the probability distribution's at Bob's 
detection plane (in the faint-photon case). This intensity pattern is an illustration of Bohr’s 
complementarity principle playing the crucial role in a faint-photon practical application. 
The same level of security as with polarization bases, can be achieved if using faint-photons. 
The experimental setup shown in figure 2 is somewhat more elaborate than the simple 2-
lens system above, but offers certain technical advantages. 
Alice’s setup used a red diode laser was used to illuminate a single thin slit aperture with 
width a=100  m. Before the slit the beam passed through a 2 beam expander consisting of a 
25 and 50 mm lens in confocal arrangement. Alice toggles the slit between positions s0 and s1 
using a simple translation stage. In principle, a piezoelectric or similar device driven by a 
random number generator could be used to toggle the slit position. After the slit there is a 
typical Mach-Zehnder interferometer with non-polarizing 50–50 beam splitters, with the 
imaging lens in one arm and the Fourier transform lens in the other. The interferometer 
allows Alice to switch between x and p encoding by simply choosing which of the arms to 
block. Alice can then toggle between the imaging arm and the Fourier arm using a simple 
movable beam block. Because one arm of the interferometer is always blocked, no 
interferometric stability is required. However, the interference can be exploited to initially 
ensure that the imaging and Fourier arms are properly aligned. Alice’s imaging system is 
made up of a 250 mm focal length lens  f , which creates the image of the slit on Bob's input 
plane at a distance 1000 mm from the slit in one exit arm of the interferometer. For her 
Fourier system a 500 mm focal length lens  F  creates the Fourier transform of the slit on 
Bob's input plane. The other exit arm is blocked by a beam dump. 
Bob’s detection system consisted of a 50-50 non-polarizing beam splitter that implemented 
the random choice between detection bases. In one output of the beam splitter was an 
imaging system and the other arm a Fourier system. In this proof of principle experiment a 
digital web-cam was used to photograph the detection screen (ca. 1mm resolution). 
Therefore the slit's image was magnified. For this reason, Bob’s imaging system consisted of 
a 75.6 mm focal length lens L1 placed so as to create a magnification factor of M2=8. For the 
Fourier system, a 250 mm focal length lens L2 was used to create the Fourier transform. 
The different focal lengths in Alice and Bob’s p configurations create a magnification factor 
of 1/2. To compensate for this magnification factor, an additional 50 mm focal length lens L3 
was used to image the Fourier plane onto the detection screen with a magnification factor of 
about 16, giving an overall magnification factor of 8.  
Figure 3 shows the results corresponding to Bob’s transverse position measurements 
configuration. In figure 3a, Alice encoded bit value 0 using slit position s0 and the x 
configuration. Consequently, Bob detected light in the left region on his position detection 
screen. In figure 3b  Alice sendt bit value 1 using slit position s1 and the x configuration; 
likewise Bob detected light in the right position of his detection screen. These results show 
the correlation between the slit position and Bob’s detection position when both parties 
implement x configurations. Figures 3c and 3d  show results when Alice encodes slit 
positions s0 and s1 using momentum encoding. Here photons fall on both detector positions 
independent of the slit position, indicating no correlation between Alice’s preparation and 
Bob’s measurements. 
Figure 4 shows digital photos of the results at Bob’s momentum detector for the same 
sequence of measurements as in figure 3. In figures 4a and 4b  Alice used x encoding to send 
slit positions s0 and s1, respectively. No correlation was seen at Bob’s momentum detector. 
In figures 4c and 4d Alice used momentum encoding to send slit positions s0 and s1, and as 
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expected Bob detected photons in the correct positions (observe the “-“ sign, inversion, 
associated with the double-Fourier transform). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Results for using position base: (a) bit 0 and (b) bit 1 for Alice encoding in position 
base, (c) bit 0 and (d) bit 1 for Alice encoding in momentum base. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Results for using momentum base: (a) bit 0 and (b) bit 1 for Alice encoding in position 
base, (c) bit 0 and (d) bit 1 for Alice encoding in momentum base. 
The correlations shown in figures 3a, 3b, 4c and 4d show that Alice can send random bits to 
Bob, while the random results shown in figures 3c, 3d, 4a, and 4b  demonstrate that an 
eavesdropper Eve will necessarily disturb the system when she guesses the wrong 
measurement basis. Furthermore, her disturbance will show up in Bob’s measurement 
results. As discussed, for each photon sent, it is necessary for Eve to guess Alice’s basis, x or 
p. After transmission, Eve will know if she guessed correctly or not by listening in on Alice 
and Bob’s classical communication. If she guessed correctly, she will have detected the 
photon at the correct position and will know the bit that Alice sent. She will have 
reproduced Alice’s original state and sent it to Bob. However, one-half of the time Eve 
guesses incorrectly, and every photon has an equal probability of being detected at either 
position, as shown in figures 3c, 3d, 4a and 4b. In this case, Eve has no information 
regarding the bit sent by Alice and is thus unable to reproduce her original state with 
certainty. If Alice and Bob calibrate their system correctly, Eve will cause a 25% error rate if 
she intercepts every photon.  
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Polarisation coding – this approach encrypts the bits in the bases shown in figure 1. Should 
Bob measure the pulse in the wrong base, he will obtain an ambiguous result. Similar to 
position-momentum encoding, faint photon pulses are crucial: should there be plenty of 
photons, the pulse can be divided into two, measured in both bases and retained the result 
only of the one not ambiguous (the wrong base would have a 50-50% statistic of “0” and “1” 
photons). 
Phase coding – this approach encrypts the phase difference in a Mach-Zehnder 
interferometer as in the setup of (Hendrych, 2002). Alice and Bob each have a phase shifter 
in one of the arms of the interferometer (figure 5) and by applying suitable combinations of 
phase shifts, the interference can be tuned to be constructive/destructive (bits 1,0), or 
(quantum mechanically) random. The probability for a photon from the laser, entering the 
interferometer, and detected at detector D1 or D2 is: ( 1 ± cos(Δϕ) ) / 2  -  for the case of zero 
attenuation and no environmental noise. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Quantum encoding of phase difference in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. For Δϕ = 
(0, π) Bob’s base coincides with Alice’s and his measurements are exact. For Δϕ = ±π/2 his 
base does not coincide with Alice’s and the results of his measurements are stochastic (with 
the quantum predicted probabilities). 
As a typical BB84 protocol implementation, Alice randomly sets one of the four phase shifts 
-π/2, 0, π/2, π and Bob also randomly chooses his measurement basis by setting his phase 
shift 0, or π/2. When Δϕ = 0, π, the measurement being performed in the same base, yields 
bits 1, 0 (constructive, or destructive interference). However, when Bob’s base is orthogonal 
to Alice’s base, the outcome can be ambiguous. 
Since Alice and Bob are spatially separated, this implementation of would suffer from 
substantial problems due to environment perturbations, thermal drifts, etc. For the 
interference not to be washed out, the difference of the optical lengths of the 
interferometer’s arms must stay constant to within a fraction of the wavelength of the used 
light. Different temperature fluctuations in the two optical fibers result in different changes 
in their refractive indices and smear out the interference. 
To avoid this problem both paths of the interferometer can be launched into the same 
optical fiber, figure 6. 
Such an interferometer comprises of two identical unbalanced interferometers, with path 
length difference much greater than the coherence length of the laser. Thus altough no 
interference occurrs in the small interferometers, globally the total system preserves the 
correct interference. Fiber couplers perform random 50:50 splitting, so photons can go on 
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Fig. 6. Environmental perturbations can be eliminated using a time-multiplexing 
interferometer. In this setup Alice’s and Bob’s interferometers are identical unbalanced 
interferometers, whose with path length differences on the order of tens of cm. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Time of arrival for pulse in a 15-m time-multiplexing interferometer (circles detector 
D1, triangles D2). Photons arrive in 3 time windows separated by 10 ns (corresponding to 
the arm length difference of 2m): the leftmost peak photons taking short-short paths, the 
rightmost peak photons taking long-long paths. Interference occurs only in the middle 
(long-short, short-long) time window. 
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any of the four possible combinations from Alice to Bob: Alice’s short path and Bob’s short 
path 25 %, Alice’s long path and Bob’s short path 25 %, Alice’s short path and Bob’s long 
path 25 % and Alice’s long path and Bob’s long path 25 %. Typicall the length difference 
between the short and long arms of either interferometer is tens of cm’s. Photons arrive at 
Bob’s detectors in three time windows (separated by typically 10 ns – figure 6). There is no 
interference in the first and third time (short-short and long-long paths), however long-short 
and short-long paths are indistinguishable – and interfere. This method in effect is an 
interferometer analogous to that of figure 4, however, at the expense of losing half the 
photons (on the short-short- and long-long paths) it is possible to eliminate environmental 
fluctuations by being assured of having both paths of the interferometer equally affected by 
the latter. What still needs to be stabilised are the small unbalanced interferometers, where 
the short an long paths are spatially separated. To achieve this, the small unbalanced 
interferometers can be placed for instance in Styrofoam boxes (Hendrych, 2002). 
As an overview on the effects contributing to the widths of the peaks: part is due to the 
width of laser pulses (4 ns), 0.5 ns to detector jitter and 0.3 ns to processing electronics jitter. 
Entanglement coding – in this approach the photons are created by shining the laser 
through a non-linear crystal, producing entangled pairs of photons via spontaneous 
parametric downconversion. Figure 8 shows that in either polarisation base, the same 
(maximal) entanglement is present. As Alice (or even a third party – can be Eve !) prepares 
an entangled pair, she holds her part of the pair, a photon, and sends to Bob his part, the 
pair photon. When either Bob or Alice detects one’s own photon, quantum laws guarantee 
that the other’s photon is in the entanglement correspondent state. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Collapse of the entangled state by Alice’s detection of her photon guarantees that Bob 
has his photon in the same state of polarisation and  in the same base. 
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Any attempt at eavesdropping by Eve destroys the correlated pair in a way that Alice and 
Bob can detect. Eve cannot gain any information by capturing photons because the actual 
information does not exist until Bob or Alice make their measurements. The act of measuring 
creates the actual bit (0, or 1) that is to be sent. This is because either of the photons is in a 
non-eigen state for both bases (indeed an outstanding feature even for single-particle 
quantum mechanics !) and the collapse of its wavefunction determines what bit value the 
measuremtent will be. A remarkable consequence is that the bit’s creation basis is decided 
upon measurement, and that namely by either Alice or Bob. Should the other use the wrong 
basis, an ambiguous result will ensue. 
Should Eve conceive substituting herself for the source of entangled photons and produce 3 
entanglement correlated photons, with the extra one held for herself without disturbing 
Alice or Bob, this will be noticed in the wavelength of the photons. At the single-photon 
level this translates in a different detection efficiency and non-optimal (path and thermal 
drift) compensations all equipments have. At the statistical level the wavelength can be 
measured and the generated keys discarded. 
2.3 The BB84 protocol 
Figure 9 illustrates how Alice transmits to Bob a raw key, how this is sifted and how this is 
further used to detect communication channel noise/ interference and produce the final key 
– (Bennett and Brassard, 1984). 
 
 
Fig. 9. Schematic of the BB84 protocol: the role of conjugate quantum bases (+, ×) and 
outcome both when using the correct and when using the wrong base are shown. 
Firstly Alice selects the base for each bit, then decides on the 0,1 value of the bit. She does 
not tell Bob about the choices, not yet. She then sends the set to Bob, who chooses randomly 
a base in which to measure the qubits (quantum bits). In figure 8 the fist base is wrong and 
the result unreliable. The second one is correct and the recorded result faithful to the set sent 
by Alice ... etc. After the set is received Alice and Bob publicly exchange the information 
about the bases (and not about the bits). They discard those where Bob was wrong. For the 
hypothetical intercepter Eve this information is too late. To be in any way relevant she 
should have intercepted at least 2 photons and have measured one in one base and one in 
the other. However 2 photons out of a 2-3 photon pulse is too much (moreover, intercepting 
1 photon for 1 measurement is likely insuficient). 
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In case of the position/momentum method the BB84 protocol would ensue as follows: 
• Before any key bits are transmitted, Alice and Bob align their detectors so that Bob can 
establish detection positions that correspond to Alice’s slit positions. They perform this 
alignment procedure using (xx) and (pp) configurations. 
• Alice generates random bits a1 and a2. She aligns her slit aperture to position s(a1)  and 
prepares either an x eigenstate a2=0  or a p eigenstate  a2=1  to Bob's input plane. 
• Bob generates a random bit b2, which determines the basis x or p  in which he will 
measure. He detects the photon and records the result as bit b1. If no photon is 
detected, the run is automatically discarded. 
• Alice and Bob repeat steps 2 and 3 until a sufficient number of photons have been 
transmitted and detected. 
• Bob reveals his detection bases x or p for all his measurements using a classical 
communication channel. They agree to discard all results in which they 
prepared/measured in conjugate bases. 
• Alice and Bob use a subset of the remaining results to check the quality of their 
correlations and estimate the error rate, which can be used to determine an upper 
bound on the amount of information possibly available to Eve. If the error rate is too 
large, Alice and Bob regard transmitted key compromised, they discard it and do not 
use it in crypting data. They repeat the run. 
• If the error rate is acceptable, Alice and Bob use error correction to minimize errors and 
privacy amplification to minimize Eve’s information. 
In the of entangled-photons, the BB84 protocol takes the following form: 
• Alice encodes each random bit value using one of two non-orthogonal polarizations: for 
example, horizontal (H) or +45o (D) can encode “0”, while vertical (V) or −45◦ (E) can 
encode “1” 
• Bob randomly measures each photon’s polarization in either of the two conjugate bases 
(H/V or D/E) and records the results. 
• Then, by conventional public communications Alice and Bob reveal their basis choice 
(but not the bit value) for each detected event, and sift out the (perfectly correlated) set 
for which they used the same bases, and discard the uncorrelated, wrong-basis events 
(approximately half of the detected bits in an ideal system). If Eve intercepts every 
photon, measures its polarization, and sends an appropriately polarized photon on to 
Bob, she will induce an error rate of 25–50%. The lower limit is obtained only if Eve 
makes her measurements in the same bases used by Alice and Bob (or in a basis that lies 
in the same plane on the Poincare sphere: for example, if Alice and Bob use the (H/V) 
and (D/E) linear polarization bases, then eavesdropping in any linear polarization basis 
will yield an error rate of 25%. In contrast, eavesdropping in the left/right (L/R) 
circular polarization basis will induce an error rate of 50% (Naik, 2000). 
It can be seen now how Eve’s presence is revealed to Alice and Bob. After obtaining the 
sifted key, they can sacrifice a small part of the bits to test the noise/error-rate of the 
communication channel: Alice decides which bits and Bob sends publicly their values. Alice 
then reports back the BER (bit error rate). If this is above 11% (Lütkenhaus, (1999), should 
Eve be the reason for this high value, it may be assumed that she has had a starting-to-be-
viable chance at gaining information on the transmission. Figure 10 (falling curve) shows the 
set’s discarded fraction as a function of sifted key error rate during information 
reconciliation (Brassard Salvail, 1993), a protocol to eliminate errors in the set used. Privacy 
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amplification is a method for reducing (and effectively eliminating) Eve's partial 
information on the transmission. This can be done with a hash function, randomly chosen 
from a given set of functions, with entry a binary string of length equal to the key and 
output a shorter string reducing the probability of Eve having knowledge of the new key to 
a minimal value (calculated as a ratio of the shrinkage factor). Secure transmission is 
guaranteed for error rate under  11 %. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Losses for Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification as a function of 
sifted key error rate. Secure transmission is guaranteed for error rate <  11%. 
3. QUANTGRID – Encryption for GRID Applications 
It is evident that this encryption technology is attractive to a number of other technologies 
relying on encrypted communications, such as bank communications, government 
communications and of course GRID-computing file transfers. 
In this respect a test programme was started in the Institute for Nuclear Physics and 
Engineering (Particle Physics and IT Department) in collaboration with the Institute for 
Lasers and Plasma Physics and the Polytechnical University (all Bucharest-Romania). The 
applications under way in the department concern processing data from CERN’s LHC 
experiments, thus large data fluxes are involved. It is known that quantum encryption 
equipment produces key rates on the order of a few kbps. These need to be amplified in 
order to be used for the large amounts of data involved. This can be achieved for instance by 
taking sections from the last transmitted data segment and AES-encrypting them, then using 
this volume of key as the actual one to do the encryption. 
In the following will be described our quantum encryption stand and the software we 
produced to use in the actual data transmissions of this project (QUANTGRID, 2010). 
3.2 Quantum encryption unit 
A number of component providers (Equipment, 2010) exist on the market, the setup here 
presented being based on Clavis2 components (ID-Quantique, 2009) from ID-Quantique, 
which offer the possibility of further configuration modification and future experimentation. 
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The setup in figure 11 consists of the Bob station (receiver), the Alice station (sender), a 
23.845 km (quantum channel) optical line between Alice and Bob for the secret key, 2 
dedicated computers handling the Bob and Alice stations and a LAN Ethernet (classical 
channel) connection between the computers for the encrypted data. The components are 
described below:  
 
 
Fig. 11. Communication line setup with two dedicated computers (Bob – receiver and Alice 
– sender). The quantum channel (23.845 km) is a dedicated optical fiber line, while the 
classical channel is via LAN Ethernet.  
Bob station (receiver) – for an auto-compensated setup, the information Alice sends is 
physically produced by Bob in the form of intense laser pulses that are sent to Alice, 
reflected back (phase modulated) and detected by Bob as the receiver. After the laser the 
pulses are split and enter an unbalanced interferometer: one half through the long arm and 
the other through the short one, after which they are further recombined at an exit phase 
beam-splitter. On the return way from Alice the pulses take complementary paths and the 
long arm applies the phase modulation corresponding to Bob’s decision for a measurement 
basis. They then interfere and are detected with the single-photon detectors (avalanche 
photodiodes in Geiger mode). Polarization maintaining fibers are used throughout.  
Components: 
• Laser Diode: pulse energy of -17 dBm @ 500ps, pulse duration of 300-2500 ps, pulse 
power measured with a photodiode 
• 2 Photon-Counting Detectors: bias voltage controlled, dead-time on/off and duration 
(FPGA controlled) 
• Phase modulator: with phase voltage control (0, π) 
• Optical Components: circulator, coupler, polarization splitter. 
Electronics: 
• mainboard – used for handling of high level functions. On-board microcontroller 
providing USB interface, running temperature regulation, and dedicated PortC and I2C 
for communication with other electronic components (FPGA and ADC/DAC  I2C 
compatibles, temperature sensor, etc). The FPGA controls 4 different pulsers, DAQ, 
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formatting and storage. An on-board acquisition channel monitors component 
operations. 
• laser, phase modulator and detector boards – dedicated to optoelectronic interfacing, 
mainly for specific driving functions in accordance to the optoelectronics they drive 
(gating and/or temperature regulation). 
The electronics performs five main tasks: 
1. Status monitoring and hardware parameter storage – monitoring of power supplies, 
APD cooler current/temperature, etc, mainly by the microcontroller.  
2. Laser diode control – duration and timing of pulses through an FPGA driven pulser 
mode (mainboard implemented). Temperature regulation and laser power 
measurement are performed using the internal photodiode of the laser. 
3. Phase modulator control – duration and amplitude setting of phase modulation pulses 
through an FPGA driven pulser mode (mainboard implemented). Two different states 
are possible: zero/adjustable amplitude state (state 0/1). 
4. Photon-counting detectors control – independent setting of bias voltage for each 
detector. A current source embedded on the detector board (mainboard microcontroller 
steered), regulates the detector temperature to −50o C and allows control of the duration 
and timing of the gates applied on the APD, by sensing avalanches and converting 
them on FPGA captured detections. 
5. Transfer of bit values for key exchange – retrieval of random bits generated by the 
mainboard embedded random generator. The 2 bits values are sent sequentially to the 
phase modulator board, for storage in embedded memory together the detector 1/2 
counts, then sent to the controlling PC via USB/microcontroller. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Communication line setup used in the QUANTGRID D11-044 project (Inst. for Laser 
and Plasma Phys. – Bucharest), with its two dedicated computers (Bob – receiver and Alice – 
sender). The quantum channel (23.845 km) optical fiber spool is on top of the Bob station. 
The classical channel linking the computers is local LAN Ethernet. 
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Alice station (sender) – although not directly, physically, producing the pulses, it encodes 
them by modulating the phase of the second pulse half. The pulses from Bob are split at 
input by a 10/90 coupler, with the bright part (90%) directed to a classical detector which 
provides the timing for gating and scrutinizes the incoming signal for intensity variations 
from potential eavesdroppers (Trojan Horse attack: intense signal injection for phase 
modulator probing, i.e. - for the sent information). The weak part (10%) is directed into the 
“quantum emitter”: variable optical attenuator (set to guarantee “faint photon” level of the 
pulses sent to Bob), long delay line (12 or 24 km, preventing spurious detections caused 
from Rayleigh backscattering), phase modulator (acting on the second half of each pulse) 
and Faraday mirror (ensuring passive compensation of polarisation mode dispersion effects 
in the optical link on a round-trip). 
Components: 
• Variable optical attenuator (dual channel): attenuation 1.5 - 50 dB, channel 1 (at 
quantum emitter input), channel 2 (in front of the classical detector) 
• Classical Detector: bias voltage 30 - 60V, 2 discriminators (detection of Bob’s pulses and 
monitoring of incoming – Trojan Horse attack guard) 
• Phase modulator: phase voltage with 4 values (0, π/2, π, 3π/2) 
• Optical components: delay line, coupler, Faraday mirror. 
Electronics: 
• mainboard – handling high level functions, it includes a microcontroller providing the 
USB interface, running a dedicated 8 bit interface to the FPGA and an I2C bus for 
communications with other electronic components (DAC, ADC, temperature sensor, 
etc). An FPGA controlling four different pulsers, data acquisition, formatting and 
storage before sending them to the PC is used. The peripheral boards enclose 
components with mainly specific driving functions according to the optoelectronic they 
have to drive (gating and/or temperature regulation), and an acquisition channel which 
is used to monitor component operations. 
• detector and phase modulator boards – dedicated to optoelectronic interfacing, with 
components having mainly specific driving functions according to the optoelectronics 
they drive (gating and/or temperature regulation), and an acquisition channel which is 
used to monitor component operations. 
The peripheral boards perform the following tasks: 
1. Status monitoring and hardware parameter storage – monitoring of power supplies, 
temperature and storage for availability to the controlling computer. 
2. Variable optical attenuator control – by the two variable optical attenuators. The stepper 
motor attenuator is controlled through an I2C bus. 
3. Classical detector control – used to set bias voltage and threshold levels of the two 
discriminators connected to detector output. Synchronization output signal of the 
discriminators is fed back into the high-level electronics. 
4. Phase modulation – voltage setting for the four phase values (one for each state) via 
DAC and multiplexer. Precise timing of the actuation comes from the delay of the 
timing signal from the classical detector. 
5. Transfer of bit values for key exchang – retrieval of random bits generated by the 
embedded random generator on the mainboard. The 2 bit values are sent sequentially 
to the phase modulator, there stored on embedded data memory and sent to the 
controlling PC (through the microcontroller and USB bus). 
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The actual processes that take place on the equipment are numerous, both units, Alice and 
Bob, being highly automated. The mode of operation of the hardware is in cycles. During 
each cycle, a complete frame is produced. A cycle contains the following steps (figure 13): 
• Laser pulse train – the electronics sends a train of laser pulses (period 200 ns) and 
produces the laser start signal. The number of pulses is limited by the long delay line 
enclosed in Alice. 
• Alice sync – synchronization of Alice’s clock to the incoming laser pulse train 
frequency, producing a clock synchronization signal. 
• Alice phase modulation – phase modulation (PM) gate is then applied on the second 
component of each pulse. Phase modulation amplitude is chosen randomly from the 
four states for each pulse. Phase modulation is applied after a fixed Alice coarse delay 
versus clock synchronization signal, corresponding to the laser pulse train time of flight 
through the delay line. 
• Bob phase modulation – phase modulation gate is applied on the first component of 
each pulse. Phase modulation amplitude is chosen randomly from two states for each 
pulse. Phase modulation is applied after a fixed Bob PM coarse delay, corresponding to 
a roundtrip of the laser pulse train time of flight through the transmission line and 
Alice. The Bob detector-1 Coarse Delay is used as reference point to compute the Bob 
PM Coarse Delay. 
• Bob detection – detector-1 and detector-2 (D1 and D2) gates are applied on the single 
photon detectors to activate them when encoded weak pulses return. These gates are 
applied after a variable delay – combination of a coarse delay and a fine delay for each 
detector – versus laser start signal. These variable delays (for D1 and D2) are 
determined from the line measurement process, so that the detectors are activated when 
the laser pulses hit them. These delays are independent for each detector. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Time sketch of the processes: Laser pulse train, Alice sync, Alice phase modulation, 
Bob phase modulation, Bob detection, Next frame, Raw key distillation 
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• Next frame – waiting for the end of the frame period. Next frame cannot be sent if the 
current frame is not received by Bob entirely. 
• Raw key distillation – the entire procedure is repeated a number of times until the stop 
condition applies. Once this state has been reached, the pulser is reset. All 
measurements (Detection, Alice and Bob Phases) are stored and constitute the raw key. 
The data is then sent to the controlling computer for distillation and further processing. 
3.3 Encryption and communications software 
We designed 2 C++ packages enabling us to handle socket communications and AES 
encryption (SXV4 and AXV4, 2008). In particular we are working on applying the two 
packages in a hopping-sockets configuration in which we constantly change the connection 
port (based on a number transmitted in the encryption key) as to avoid software 
surveillance in the target computer: 
• SXV4 – proprietary C++ class for the handle of socket level communications. This gives 
us a handle close to the hardware level, of interacting with the communication ports 
• AXV4 – proprietary C++ class implementing the FIPS-197 AES standard. This allows us 
to take control of the procedure and intervene in taking information from intermediate 
stages in the en/decryption. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Server response times package, for 2400 bit/sample and 8000 bit/sample tests. 
Multiple samples are transmitted for each point on the plots. It can be seen that an 
optimisation allots high priority to tasks loading the net-card with large data batches, in 
order to expedite the job, and lessens the priority for small batches of data on the net-card, 
whether they occur seldomly or frequently. 
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SXV4 tests – we have tested the C++ package on two servers on the same cluster – which is 
very similar to the configuration quant-modem-to-GRID port, by sending various data 
samples, of different lengths. Typical transmit-times are presented in figure 14 - function of 
the number of samples in the same transmit-job. We fitted the server response to saturating 
functions in order to have an estimate of transmission times for repeated transmissions. A 
complete map of tests was performed, in the range of 8, 24, 80, 240, 800, 2400, 8000, 24000 
bit/sample. 
For large samples (over 8000 bit/sample) the transmission time changes from a slowly rising 
one to a flat (or faintly decreasing) one, on the order of 1 ms/S. This has to do with the 
optimisation of large data fluxes (in a single connection) on ports. 
AXV4 tests – we have tested the C++ package as AES is known to be somewhat slow on 
decryption. Indeed, in our implementation of the FIPS-197 standard we found it to be 5 
times slower in decryption over encryption. Also, importantly, whereas for small versus 
large file sizes the time/character varies within 30% for decryption, for encryption this ratio 
is roughly a factor of 8 (figures 15 – encryption, and 16 – decryption). 
 
 
Fig. 15. Performance of AXV4 in encrypting a file function of file size (saturation on the 
order of 60 μs/character, for file above 2000 characters) – left. Performance function of the 
key length used (blue = 128 bit, red = 192, green = 256) – right. A linear dependence with 
key size is observed. 
This is important in timing both sender and receiver processes such that they have the 
proper time in performing the necessary packing/unpacking, switching ports, etc. 
Another interesting factor we looked for in the tests was the relative advantage time wise 
versus the key length used – on a dual-P4 2.66 Pentium machine: 
• 128 bit key – for this key length the average encryption time per character ranges 
exponentially decreasing from 0.32 ms/character (at 10 characters/file) down to 0.05 
ms/character (at 300000 characters/file). For decryption the same numbers are 0.32 
ms/character and 0.25 ms/character (a ratio of 1.28 vs. 6.4 for encryption). 
• 192 bit key – for this key length the average encryption time per character ranges 
exponentially decreasing from 0.36 ms/character (at 10 characters/file) down to 0.06 
ms/character (at 300000 characters/file). For decryption the same numbers are 0.39 
ms/character and 0.31 ms/character (a ratio of 1.26 vs. 6.0 for encryption). 
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• 256 bit key – for this key length the average encryption time per character ranges 
exponentially decreasing from 0.43 ms/character (at 10 characters/file) down to 0.07 
ms/character (at 300000 characters/file). For decryption the same numbers are 0.41 





Fig. 16. Performance of AXV4 in decrypting a file function of file size (saturation on the 
order of 60 μs/character, for file above 2000 characters) – left. Performance function of the 
key length used (blue = 128 bit, red = 192, green = 256) – right. A linear dependence with 
key size is observed. 
7. Conclusion 
Quantum encryption is a very promising technology in securing data transfers – as shown, a 
number of quantum methods being available – each with its own advantages: simpler 
practical implementation, stability to thermal drift, immunity to eavesdropping, higher key 
generation rate. So far commercial components exist mostly in the form of polarisation and 
phase encoding. 
Implementation in GRID-computing depends, at the moment at least, on boosting the key 
generation rate from a few kbps to at least a few 0.1 Mbps. This can be achieved for instance 
by using the quantum key to AES-encrypt sections of the transmitted data, and then use the 
resulting volume as key. 
The project here presented, QUANTGRID, is a first attempt at using this technology in 
GRID data transfers. Auxiliary software was developed for embedding quantum keys in the 
transfers: a proprietary sockets package that allows to hop the communication port on the 
target machine avoiding surveillance software and an AES encryption package that allows 
to take control of the procedure and intervene in taking information from intermediate 
stages in the en/decryption. The project – funded under D11-044 (CNMP-Romania, for the 
quantum technology) and in part by PN-09370104 (ANCS-Romania, for the GRID 
technology) – is ongoing. 
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